SIGNATURE GROUP HOLDINGS, INC. Form DFAN14A May 10, 2013

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

(Rule 14a-101)

INFORMATION REQUIRED IN

PROXY STATEMENT

SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Filed by the Registrant " Filed by a Party other than the Registrant x

Check the appropriate box:

- " Preliminary Proxy Statement
- " Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
- Definitive Proxy Statement
- Definitive Additional Materials
- x Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12

Signature Group Holdings, Inc.

(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

NEW SIGNATURE, LLC

CHARLESTOWN CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC

RAJ MAHESHWARI

LEE SMITH

BOUCHARD 10S LLC

CRAIG T. BOUCHARD

DUART HOLDINGS LLC

MALCOLM F. MACLEAN IV

STEVEN GIDUMAL

CLIFFORD D. NASTAS

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

No fee required.		
Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.		
(1)	Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:	
(2)	Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:	
(2)	Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies.	
(3)	Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):	
	the filling fee is calculated and state now it was determined).	
(4)	Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:	
(5)	Total fee paid:	
(3)	Total rec para.	

Fee p	paid previously with preliminary materials.		
	Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.		
(1)	Amount Previously Paid:		
(2)	Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:		
(3)	Filing Party:		
(4)	Date Filed:		

A New Vision for SGGH: Maximizing Shareholder Value THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE May 9, 2013

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New Signature
As Time is Running Out!
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
A New Vision for SGGH
2
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SGGH Is Underperforming In All Respects First, Signature s stock currently trades 40% below the approximate Net Asset Value (NAV)*. A New Vision for SGGH THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE We know of **VERY FEW** Acquisition companies that trade below NAV. *NAV does not include the value of the Operating Losses (NOLs). All calculations based on Company 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2012. **As adjusted per our calculations of current value.

NAV per Share': \$0.92-1.00

```
Share Price (May 8, 2013):
$0.55
Discount to NAV
40-45%
Net Asset Value Analysis
($mn's)
Assets
12/31/2012
Less:
12/31/2012
Cash and Equivalents
$54
Contingent Consideration
$4
Investment Securities
Notes Payable
37
Loans Receivable**
33
Term Loan
7
NABCO**
55
Seller Notes
3
Other Assets (Vera Manufacturing)**
10
Cosmed**
Reversal of Repurchase Reserve**
Total
$163
Total
$51
Approximate Net Asset Value (NAV)
Approximate NAV per Share
$0.92-1.00
```

SGGH Is Underperforming In All Respects

Second,

Signature s

market

cap

is

lower

than

the

value

of its

Federal

NOL!

Note: Per the 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2012 (p.4), SGGH had a federal NOL of \$886.9 million.

Note: This chart does NOT include the value of Signature s state NOLs.

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

Signature Today
Weak Board of Directors
Inexperienced Management
Failed to Execute a Strategy
Wasteful Cost Structure
We

believe

SGGH

trades

well

below

NAV

because

the

company

has:

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A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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Weak Board
Is running the company from Texas
Company HQ is in California
Deal flow is in New York and Chicago
Little discernible skill or experience with the
sorts of acquisitions appropriate to SGGH
CEO Chris Colville:

Absentee

Edward Lamb:

Pre-Bankruptcy Fremont Executive

John Koral:

Retired Contractor

Retired construction company executive

No public company experience

On board since Emergence from Bankruptcy

Robert Schwab*:

Retired

Works for Los Angeles Clippers

basketball

club

Former senior executive at Fremont General

prior to bankruptcy

Least qualified member of the Board

Appears to have no experience searching,

sourcing, evaluating or executing business

transactions

The current board members lacks the skills and experience needed

to maximize the value of

Signature s assets.

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We believe Mr. Schwab has withdrawn his

candidacy for the Board

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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Weak Board Needs Checks & Balances
Why Does Sam Zell Care about SGGH?
Per Forbes, Sam Zell has a net worth
of \$4B as of March 2013.
Zell s ownership of SGGH stock
(11.3mm shares) cost EGI (Zell s
Fund)
only
\$5mm,
or
0.12%
of
Zell s
net worth.

Sam Zell s placement of one of his Managers on the Board coupled with the Weak Board creates an environment for Potential Conflicts

We Believe Sophisticated Investors like Sam Zell and others like him <i>should</i>
care
about the value (from the useable NOLs) residing in Signature 7
We believe sophisticated investors willing to backstop our deals
should be embraced
However,
we
believe
there
are
many
investors
that
will
work
with
us
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
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Chaos In The Boardroom
8
For
a
company
with
only
two
small
operating
businesses,
SGGH
has
had
extraordinary turnover in the Board of Directors. Since the 2010 Emergence
from Bankruptcy, 14
people have served on Signature s board.
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
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We

believe

Chris

Colville

is

NOT

the

right

CEO

for

SGGH:

Inexperienced Management

During Mr. Noell s tenure:

SGGH failed to execute any significant deals to utilize the

NOLs

The share price declined by

over 25% since Emergence from bankruptcy, underperforming the market by over 70% Signature generated over \$21mm in operating losses Failed as Chairman of **SGGH** No M&A experience or acumen In the kind of deals necessary to assure Signature success Over the last year, Colville: Provided board oversight during the period of significant shareholder value destruction Approved the severance package for Craig Noell, in which the Board unnecessarily paid Mr. Noell \$650,000 in cash and 2 million shares of stock and warrants Had no succession plan in place upon the resignation of Mr. Noell Upon becoming CEO, accepted 250,000 shares with accelerated vesting untied to performance Protégé of Craig Noell A New Vision for SGGH THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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What do the replacement circuit breaker, cosmetics and contract furniture manufacturing industries have to do with each other? 10 Signature is a company without a clear strategy for sustainable shareholder value creation A New Vision for SGGH THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE SGGH has only made small acquisitions in unrelated industries, none of which create significant value for the company We believe it demonstrates a seat-of-the-pants approach to

No Clear Strategy And No Ability To Execute

acquisitions and SGGH acquisition strategy

Wasteful Cost Structure

Share count has increased from 112.6mm in the first quarter postemergence to nearly 150mm (fully diluted) today, even though the stock price has declined from \$0.80 to below \$0.60.

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Operating Losses

2011: \$3mm in salaries & bonuses for top executives

2012: \$2.5mm in salaries & bonuses for top executives

November 2012: General Counsel Chris Manderson was hired by the company for \$1.1mm*

2013:

When Chris Colville was hired as CEO, he was awarded 250,000 restricted shares of stock with an accelerated vesting schedule untied to Colville s performance

Noell resigned, but the Board deemed separation as termination without cause Noell was paid over \$650,000 in unnecessary cash compensation **PLUS** Vesting of 1.5mn options and 500,000 shares of restricted stock 20 full-time employees at the parent/holding company level Since Emergence from bankruptcy cumulative operating losses in excess of \$21mm Excessive executive compensation relative to performance Outrageous and **Unnecessary Departure Gift** to Craig Noell Inefficient Staffing and **Excessive Overhead** Dilutive Stock Awards A New Vision for SGGH THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE *\$270,000 base salary 756,000 options (vesting over 3 years) worth approximately \$700,000 195,000 shares of restricted stock worth approximately \$100,000

Wasteful Cost Structure

While

the

Shareholders

have

suffered,

the

Board

has

paid

itself

lavishly:

12

Sources: 2012 Company proxy filing (p. 14), 2012 Company 10-K/A (p. 4); 2012

Company 10-K (pp. 29-30).

And the Board has continued its lavish ways in 2013:

Additional Disclosed Director Payments in 2013:

Craig Noell

Resignation Payment

\$650,000

2mn shares & options

Chris Colville

Gift of Accelerated Vesting

250,000 shares of stock

The 2012 payments are in addition to the \$1 million in cash and stock paid to Chris Manderson upon becoming General Counsel in 2012.

Year

Director

Compensation

SGGH Operating

Loss

2011

\$810,275

(\$20,221,000)

2012

\$853,224

(\$7,072,000)

Cumulative

\$1,663,499

(\$27,293,000)

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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Our Vision For A New Signature Appoint a seasoned CEO with the skills and experience to maximize the value of Signature s assets Build a lean, experienced, capable, and professional management team Compensate employees appropriately for goals achieved Top-notch Board to oversee value creation Pursue meaningful acquisitions Complete 1 or 2 large (goal of >\$50mn in EBITDA) transactions that will efficiently utilize the NOLs Signature is the surviving company Develop an appropriate capital structure. For example, finance the transaction(s) with bank debt, high-yield debt, cash and new equity 13 Our Mission is to raise the stock price significantly through a series of steps:

A New Vision for SGGH THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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Our Slate For A New Signature Board
CEOs with public company experience
Strong corporate governance and existing company
knowledge
Appropriate and proven deal experience
Continued flow of deals that may be appropriate for
SGGH
Proven successful track record for investor and
shareholder value creation
A clear vision for generating value at SGGH
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Unlike the current Board,
our slate offers:
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
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SGGH Must Consider Large Deals
Higher EBITDA should result in a higher stock
price (allowing us to issue proportionally fewer
shares in an acquisition)
15
The bigger the deal, the higher proportion of
debt the market will allow to fund the
acquisition
Large Deals Should Allow More Efficient Financing:
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Deal Structure Examples
Acquisition

```
EBITDA
25.0
$
35.0
$
50.0
$
75.0
$
100.0
Assumed Purchase Price
162.5
$
227.5
$
325.0
$
487.5
$
650.0
Multiple on EBITDA*
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
Financing
Debt
100.0
$
140.0
$
200.0
$
318.8
$
450.0
 at 4.0x to 4.5x Coverage**
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.25 x
4.5 x
Cash on Hand to Use
30.0
$
```

30.0

```
$
30.0
$
35.0
$
35.0
New Equity to be Raised
32.5
$
57.5
95.0
$
133.8
165.0
Number of Shares at $0.65
50.0
88.5
146.2
na
na
Number of Shares at $1.10
na
na
86.4
121.6
150.0
*Estimate for target companies in our likely universe
**We believe the debt markets would allow us to use 4.0-4.5x leverage to finance an acquisition.
Dollars & shares in millions
```

SGGH Must Consider Large Deals
The faster the NOLs are utilized, the faster and higher the stock should rise
16
Large Deals Should Create More Value For Shareholders:
The bigger the deal, the lower the interest rate on new high yield bonds
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Creating Stock Value
EBITDA
25.0
\$
35.0
\$

```
50.0
$
75.0
100.0
Interest Expense
11.0
$
15.4
$
20.0
$
31.1
$
42.8
$
Assumed Interest Rate
11.0%
11.0%
10.0%
9.75%
9.5%
Earnings before Taxes (EBT)
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
Net Income
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
Est. Number of New Shares
50.0
```

88.5

33

```
116.3
121.6
150.0
Est. Number of Total Shares
200.0
238.5
266.3
271.6
300.0
Earnings per Share (E.P.S.)
0.07
$
0.08
$
0.11
0.16
0.19
Stock Price at P/E multiple of 10
0.70
$
0.82
$
1.13
$
1.62
$
1.91
Stock Price at P/E multiple of 15
na
na
1.69
$
2.43
$
2.86
Dollars & shares in millions
```

Larger Deals Deliver Greater Value Using up the **NOL** in 16 years or less is critical maximizing the NPV Benefit of the NOLs Every month of delay in closing a deal simply burns more cash from operations 17 Large deals and speed are essential to maximizing the value of the NOL: Small deals will never fully utilize the NOLs Small deals also imply higher cumulative transaction costs A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

```
NOL Time Usage
EBITDA
25.0
$
35.0
$
50.0
$
75.0
$
100.0
Earnings before Taxes (EBT)
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
Number of YEARs to use NOLs
64
45
30
20
16
NOL Amount today
890.0
$
890.0
$
890.0
890.0
$
890.0
Dollars & shares in millions
```

Larger Deals Deliver Greater Value

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Large deals and speed are essential to maximizing the value of the NOL:

A

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Vision

for

SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

*Assumes: \$100mn in EBITDA, generating \$57.3mn in EBT, 40% tax rate. EBITDA and debt outstanding remain constant.

**Assumes: \$25mn in EBITDA, generating \$14.0mn in EBT, 40% tax rate. EBITDA and debt outstanding remain constant.

A \$100mn EBITDA company returns the NOL value to shareholders in **16**

years*

A \$25mn EBITDA company returns the NOL value to shareholders in 64

years**
The Present Value of the NOL is significantly higher with bigger deals.
Large deals deliver value to shareholders much faster; while small deals deliver value much slower, if at all.
Value
Value

Recent Deals Our Board Slate Has Evaluated

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Transaction A:

Transaction B:

The New Signature Board Slate is seeing the type of deals that SGGH needs

Industrial Company with steady earnings and

EBITDA of approximately \$100mm

Product Supply Company with \$75mm of EBITDA

SGGH could have purchased at an attractive

price

Deal would have used the NOLs quite

effectively, creating value

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New

Vision

for

SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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Conclusion 20

Weak Board with Inappropriate Talent Mix

Inexperienced Management

Ineffective Strategy (actually, NO strategy)

Wasteful Cost Structure The New Signature Board slate offers:

CEOs with public company experience

Appropriate deal experience and access to deal flow

Demonstrated value creation for investors and shareholders

A vision for generating value at SGGH Please vote the

GOLD
Proxy!
Thank
you.
As
Time
is
Running
Out.
SGGH Today suffers from:
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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New Signature
As Time is Running Out!
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
A New Vision for SGGH
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Appendix *

The New Signature Slate 23 Craig Bouchard Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Cambelle-Inland, LLC, an entity created in 2013 through which Mr. Bouchard manages certain investment activities in China. Prior to founding Cambelle-Inland, LLC, in 2010, Mr. Bouchard founded Shale-Inland, a leading master distributor of stainless steel pipe, valves and fittings, and stamped and fabricated parts to the US energy industry with revenues approaching \$1 billion. Mr. Bouchard served as the Chief Executive Officer and later as the Chairman of the Board of Shale-Inland through 2012. Before he founded Shale-Inland, Mr. Bouchard was President and Vice Chairman of Esmark, Inc., publicly traded

company

on the NASDAQ. Mr. Bouchard co-founded Esmark, Inc. in 2004. Craig was named a finalist for the 2005 Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year Award in Illinois. His team later crafted the first and hostile reverse tender merger on Wall Street, successfully replacing 9 directors of Wheeling Pittsburg Corporation in 2007. In doing so, Esmark became the nation s fifth largest

steel

company.
During
Mr.
Bouchard s
tenure, Esmark s revenues grew from \$4 million to over \$3 billion. The company was one of the highest
appreciating stocks on the NASDAQ or the NYSE for the full year 2008. The story was told in America for
Sale,
Copyright 2009,
Craig T. Bouchard and James V. Koch (ABC-CLIO).
From
1998-2003,
Mr.
Bouchard
was
the
President
and
Chief
Executive
Officer
of
New
York
based
NumeriX,
a
risk
management
software
company
commanding
a
leading
market
share
on
Wall
Street.
Mr.
Bouchard holds a Bachelors degree from Illinois State University, a Masters Degree in Economics from Illinois
State
University,
and
an
MBA
from
the
University
of
Chicago.

He
has
been
a
member
of
the
Board
of
Trustees
of Poster University and the Foundation of the University of Montage University a manches of the Poster of
Boston University and the Foundation of the University of Montana. He is currently a member of the Board of
the D
Department
of
Athletics
at
Duke
University.
Mr.
Bouchard
holds
United
States
Patent
No.
4,212,168,
Power
Producing
Dry-Type
Cooling
Systems,
and
has
authored,
with
James
V.
Koch,
the
book
The
Caterpillar
Way.
Lessons
in Total Control of the Control of t
Leadership,
Growth
and
Stockholder

Value,	
Copyright	
2013,	
(McGraw	
Hill,	
November	
2013.	

www.craigbouchard.com).

Mr. Bouchard has significant executive experience in a variety of industries, including risk management, strategic planning, raising capital, financial engineering, a distinctive record of business successes and considerable experience in growing his companies both organically and through accretive acquisitions.

A

New

Vision

for

SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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The New Signature Slate

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Steve Gidumal

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

Since 2004, served as the co-founder, President and Portfolio Manager for Virtus Capital, L.P., a firm based in Orlando, Florida that invests in the securities of companies in distressed and restructuring situations, including a variety of real estate and financial institutions. From August 2006 to August 2008, Mr. Gidumal also served as Co-Portfolio Manager of Resurgence Asset Management, a distressed fund based in New York City for which he co-ran

a

portfolio

in

excess

of

\$400

million,

and

played

a

key

role

in

selling

operating

businesses

and

being

the

lead negotiator for a group of investors in the multi-billion Eurotunnel restructuring and in the Smartalk litigation resolution.

Mr. Gidumal served on the Board of the Company from 2011-2012. He has also been a director of Golden Gate Homes, Inc. since 2009, and has been the sole director since 2011. From 2011 to 2012, Mr. Gidumal served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of RoomStore, Inc., where

he also served on the Audit Committee, the

 $Compensation\ Committee\ and\ the\ Corporate\ Governance\ Committee.\ From\ 2006\ to\ 2008,\ Mr.\ Gidumal\ served$

as a

director

for

Sterling

Chemicals,

Inc.,

where

he also

served

on

the

Compensation

Committee.

Mr.

Gidumal

also served on the Board of Managers for Mirant Corporate Asset Recovery (MCAR) litigation trust from 2006 to 2012, where he was the lead negotiator in the litigation with

Southern Energy, where he negotiated a \$202

million cash settlement which was paid to MCAR.

Mr. Gidumal earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton undergraduate program) and a Master of Business Administration from Harvard Business School as a Baker Scholar. Mr. Gidumal is a proposed Concerned Stockholder Nominee

in light of Mr. Gidumal s significant

experience as an investor, board member and committee member. Further, Mr. Gidumal has considerable expertise in financial statement audits and capital allocation.

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The New Signature Slate
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Malcolm F. MacLean IV
Managing
Member
of
Duart
Holdings
LLC.
Mr.
MacLean
is
a
Founder,
Managing
Partner
and
Director
of
Star
Asia
Group, an opportunistic real estate debt and equity investment firm in Tokyo which was he co-founded in 2006
Mr.
MacLean is also the co-Founder and Chairman of Delta Capital Investments KK, a student housing and share-
house
investment
company
based
in
Tokyo,
which
was
founded
in
2009.
Mr.
MacLean
also
serves
as
a
Partner
at

Taurus

Partners LLC, an angel and venture capital investor. From 2000 to 2009, Mr. MacLean was the President and Head Trader at Mercury Global Real Estate Advisors LLC, a global real estate investment firm. From 1992 to 2000, Mr. MacLean was a senior investment banker in Kidder, Peabody & Co. s

Capital

PaineWebber

Inc. s Real Estate Investment Banking Groups, specializing in originating, structuring and executing of equity, debt and mergers and acquisitions transactions consummating transactions in excess of \$15 billion.

Mr.

MacLean

earned

a

Bachelor

of

Arts

degree

in

Economics

and

Law

at

Trinity

College

in

Hartford,

Connecticut.

He

also

studied

International

Economics

at

Cambridge

University

in

the

United

Kingdom.

Mr.

MacLean

has

over

20 years of experience in the global investment business having structured and consummated over \$20 billion of investments. His expertise is in identifying and making deep value and special situations investments and then creating additional value for investors.

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

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The New Signature Slate

Raj Maheshwari

Α

New

Vision

for

SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

Managing Director of Charlestown Capital Advisors, LLC, a private merchant banking company specializing in financial advisory/ merchant banking services (including mergers and acquisitions advisory) to public and private market emerging companies. Under Mr. Maheshwari s tenure, Charlestown Capital has been a mergers and acquisitions advisor

Esmark,

Inc.

steel

company

that

was

sold

to

OAO

Severstal

of

Russia

August,

2008

for \$1.3

billion.

Charlestown Capital continues to be a financial advisor to The Bouchard Group, the founders of Esmark, Inc. and to their successor companies. In 2011, Charlestown Capital led the successful reorganization of Meruelo Maddux Properties (subsequently renamed EVOQ Properties), a commercial real estate company based in Los Angeles under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Charlestown Capital, under Mr. Maheshwari s leadership, has been a strategic

mergers

and

acquisitions

advisor

emerging

companies

in a variety of sectors.

In

particular,

Charlestown

assisted in Shale-Inland s acquisitions of Main Steel in 2011 HDSupply IPVF in 2012. Charlestown Capital has also advised Akela Pharmaceuticals, LTS Lohmann, Artevea Digital, among other emerging companies, in their mergers and acquisitions activities.

Prior to founding Charlestown Capital, Mr. Maheshwari was a portfolio manager and managing director at Weiss Peck and Greer Investments (WPG). From 1999 to August, 2005, Mr. Maheshwari was a Portfolio Manager and Managing Director at WPG (and its successor parent company Robeco Investment Management). At WPG, he built and managed a \$500 million (approximately) Risk Arbitrage and Special Situations/Event Driven hedge fund. In addition, at WPG and its parent company, Robeco Investment Management, he was involved in many aspects of investment management, including asset allocation, identifying new investment strategies, and overall investment management strategy. From 1996 to 1999, Mr. Maheshwari was a Vice President of Research at Robert Fleming, Inc., where he helped run a \$250 million (approximately) equity arbitrage portfolio.

Mr. Maheshwari holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics

and Computer Sciences from the State University

of New York at Albany and an MBA from New York University. Mr. Maheshwari has considerable investing experience, as well as expertise in identifying and closing value enhancing strategic transactions and in reviewing financial statements and capital allocation.

The New Signature Slate

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Clifford D. Nastas

A New Vision for SGGH

THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE

Chief Executive Officer and a member of the Board of Directors of Material Sciences Corporation (MSC), a leading global provider of material based solutions for the automotive, electronics, appliance and construction industries, serving in those capacities since December 1, 2005. Mr. Nastas served as President and Chief Operating Officer

of

MSC

from

June

2005

to

December

2005,

and

as

Executive

Vice

President

and

Chief

Operating

Officer

from

October

2004

through

June

2005.

Prior

to

that

time,

he held

numerous

executive

positions

with

MSC

from

January 2001 to October 2004. Mr. Nastas served as the Global Automotive Business Director for Honeywell
International Inc., a technology and manufacturing provider of aerospace products, control technologies,
automotive
products,
specialty
chemicals
and
advanced
materials,
from
1995
until
he
joined
MSC
in
January

Mr. Nastas served as an independent member of the Board of Directors of Quixote Corporation and sat on its Audit Committee from 2009 until the company was sold in March 2010.

Mr. Nastas earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering from Wayne State University and an MBA from Case Western University. Mr. Nastas has significant and successful senior management experience and a wealth of public company board service experience.

*

2001.